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The role of employee incentive pay in the competitiveness of family and non-family 
firms  
Abstract 
Insufficient attention has been paid to the different roles of wage incentives in the 
competitiveness of family and non-family firms. This paper addresses this issue and uses a 
sample of listed and non-listed Italian firms for 2007 and 2010 to show that family firms that 
adopt incentive wages obtain greater gains in competitiveness with respect to non-family 
firms. Unlike what happens in non-family firms, the efficiency enhancing effect of incentive 
wages more than compensates for the premiums paid to employees and enables family firms 
to achieve significant gains in terms of competitiveness. 
 
JEL Classifications: G32, J33, D24. 
 






A large strand of literature has analyzed the role of incentive payments in the financial 
performance of firms and rigorous efforts have been made to understand differences in the 
nature of agency costs in family and non-family firms (Chrisman et al., 2004). However, the 
focus has been on executive compensations, while comparisons of employee rewards in 
family (FFs) and non–family (NFFs) firms have received much less attention. As noted by 
Carrasco-Hernandez & Sánchez-Marín (2007) this is quite surprising given that employee 
compensation costs often exceed 80% of total operating expenses and offer a more realistic 
image of firms’ costs than executive compensation costs. Furthermore, in particular with 
respect to differences in labor productivity and competitiveness between the two groups of 
firms, incentive pays offered to employees could play a significant role. Note also that, thus 
 2 
far, the family business research has predominantly paid attention to the principals’ interests 
evaluated in terms of financial outcome measures (see the recent review of Evert et al., 
2016), whereas the field of study that analyzes scenarios where agents’ contracts are 
decoupled from purely economic goals has been overlooked. A more comprehensive 
approach to capturing differentials between family and non-family firms may be grounded 
in the socioemotional wealth view (SEW). Based on the behavioral agency model and 
borrowing from prospect theory, the SEW approach emphasizes that the uniqueness of 
family firms resides in their reference points and in assigning more weights to the 
preservation of affective endowments (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). Thus, maintaining SEW, 
defined as the stock of affected related value that a family derives from its controlling 
position in a firm, is “the primary frame of reference in the management of the firm” (Gomez 
et al., 2011, p.656). Furthermore, the emotional connection family owners have with their 
firm permeates the entire organization, and as argued by Cennamo et al. (2012), family firms 
that want to preserve their affective endowment are more prone to adopt proactive 
engagement with their stakeholders. However, how these attitudes translate into distinctive 
practices with respect to employees, who represent a significant group of stakeholders, and 
how these practices influence firm competitiveness are issues that have not been explored 
thus far. The extant research adopting the SEW framework has produced few studies on 
human resource management practices and no evidence for incentive payments to 
employees, as indicated by the survey by Cruz et al. (2011). 
This paper intends to fill this gap. Its main purpose is to verify whether the adoption of wage 
incentive strategies, such as performance-related pay (PRP)1, gives rise to different wage 
                                                           
1 In the majority of European countries, including Italy, the diffusion of equity based compensation is quite 
limited, as documented by the European Working Conditions Surveys (EWCS), while one of the most important form 
of employee incentives are cash incentives that are performance-based. In the paper, with the term performance related 
pay (PRP), we refer only to this form of wage incentive for employees.  However, in order to avoid word repetition sometimes 
we also use wage incentives or incentive pays in place of PRP. 
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increases and productivity gains in family and non-family firms. Furthermore, it analyses 
the role of PRP in the productivity-wage gap to ascertain its efficacy in enhancing 
competitiveness within the two groups of firms.  
Our paper provides evidence on these issues on the basis of the behavior of family firms in 
Italy. We believe the Italian example is of interest not only because, similar to the worldwide 
evidence (La Porta et al., 1999; Westhead & Howorth, 2006), family ownership is the 
prevalent form of ownership in Italy. What makes the Italian case interesting is that in this 
economy, family involvement in top managerial positions is a pervasive feature. More than 
90 percent of (listed and nonlisted) firms that are owned by families are also under family 
management2. In terms of the relevance of the SEW view, this characteristic is of great 
importance. The family’s influence and ability to exercise authority, that are derived from 
owning and managing the firm, are typical aspects of affective, non-financial goals of family 
businesses (Berrone et al., 2012). Furthermore, family management also has an instrumental 
motive because the preservation of affective endowments, such as image and reputation, 
requires control over strategic decisions. In our sample, the desire to control and influence 
the firm is the peculiar trait of Italian family firms.  
An additional advantage of our research, which is carried out on a national scale, is the wide 
coverage and richness of our data set, which offers information for about 4,400 Italian firms 
of all sizes operating in all non-agricultural private sectors. The data at our disposal contain 
information on a wide array of variables, such as firm ownership and management, 
employment composition, personnel organization, and other firm and workplace 
characteristics. This information, which includes the diffusion of PRP negotiated by firms 
and employees in firm-level bargaining, makes it possible to identify the different roles of 
this important component of human resource management practices in FFs and NFFs.  
                                                           
2 As shown below, this information comes directly from the database we use. 
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The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the related literature and 
introduces our hypotheses; section 3 presents the data and descriptive statistics; section 4 
illustrates the econometric framework and main results; and finally, section 5 concludes. 
Literature review and hypotheses 
The different motivations of family and non-family firms may translate into distinct 
organizational designs (Astrachan et al., 2002) that mirror differences in human resources 
management (HRM) practices and differences in wage incentive strategies. However, thus 
far, a limited amount of research has investigated the wage setting policy of family firms, 
with only a few exceptions (Werner et al., 2005 and Carrasco-Hernandez & Sánchez-Marín, 
2007). The interaction of family owners, family or non-family managers and employees has 
been considered for the purpose of verifying how incentive policies may mitigate the conflict 
of interests of the family or non-family principals and their agents and how “the impact of 
ownership structure on pay–performance relations cascades to lower rungs of the 
organizational ladder” (Werner et al., 2005, p. 378). 
One limitation of this approach is its restriction to individualistic and economic motivations. 
Indeed, part of the differentials in HRM strategies, including PRP, may have a different 
explanation with respect to agency theory (see the overview by Sharma, 2004). 
A first response to the inadequacies of agency theory is found in other studies that adopt the 
stewardship view proposed by Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson (1997), which offers a 
conceptual lens to explain governance devices that deviate from agency theory (Miller & Le 
Breton-Miller, 2005). Adopting this framework, it has been argued that in some family 
businesses, managers and employees behave as stewards whose intrinsic desire is to serve 
the firm (see the recent review of Madison et al., 2016). In this vein, a number of traits, such 
as “degree of trust” and “embeddedness of social ties in emotions and sentiments, often 
contribute to building a collectivistic culture within the family firm” (Corbetta & Salvato, 
2004, p. 359). According to these hypotheses, the employee reward system, rather than being 
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shaped by agency contracts and control-oriented systems, features cooperative and altruistic 
behavior that represents self-enforcing systems of incentives (Cruz et al., 2011 p. 180). 
However, in terms of HRM policies, both views are characterized by certain pitfalls. The 
agency view fails to predict below-market wages, the low incidence of contingent payments 
and the presence of cooperative behavior. The stewardship approach does not offer adequate 
arguments to predict situations where, instead of high-trust relationships, HRM practices are 
affected by entrenchment and low commitment of employees, as found by Bloom & Van 
Reeen (2007). 
A third, integrated perspective, based on a behavioral agency model, is the SEW view, which 
centers on the role of the preservation of affective endowment as the distinctive trait of 
family firm decisions. In this view, HRM strategies are developed according to the strong 
intertwined connections of families with their business; these ties encourage family 
principals and their employees to consider the firm “an inescapable and integral part of their 
life” (Berrone et al., 2012, p. 260). 
Thus, the SEW view, as with the stewardship approach, counters the traditional approach 
grounded in agency theory and may account for collaborative actions to preserve affective 
endowments, which, more than value creation, is the main reference point of family firms. 
However, the SEW approach does not reject the idea that family members pursue personal 
aims, which is the basic premise in which agency theory is rooted (Berrone et al., 2012, p. 
261). 
Previous studies have argued that cooperation and coordination provide a foundation for the 
creation and use of family social capital (FSC), which is made up of attributes such as 
stability, interdependence, frequent interaction, and closure (Arregle et al., 2007). These 
specific traits of FSC also inform the organizational social capital, which strongly conditions 
human resources practices (such as reward systems) and reflects the character of social 
relations inside the firm (Arregle et al., 2007). These arguments support our first conjecture 
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that FFs are characterized by a lower propensity to adopt PRP for their employees with 
respect to NFFs. There are a number of reasons behind this conjecture. 
First, it may be expected that FFs are less likely to adopt incentive pay because this type of 
payment is less important according to the SEW framework. It is well known that wage 
incentives play three main functions: selection, motivation and retention (Lazear, 2000). 
Concerning selection, the adoption of incentive payments is a wage policy used to attract 
more highly skilled workers (Lazear & Oyer, 2012), and incentive pay may cause sorting 
effects, thus helping firms to attract the most skilled workers from outside (Lazear, 2000). 
However, family owners, interested in SEW preservation, are interested in the compatibility 
of hired workers “with the organization’s core philosophy and a poor compatibility is 
difficult to remedy upon selection” (Cruz et al., 2011, p.189). The reliance on the ‘person –
organization’ fit as opposed to the ‘person-job’ fit does not need competence requirements 
and does not call for wage incentives to select employees with greater abilities. 
Second, when employees enjoy greater employment security, may trade their more protected 
position at the expense of lower earnings. This implicit contract is more likely to be enforced 
in FFs. In these firms, family owners, because of their longer-term horizons, reputation 
concerns, and aims to conserve the family social capital (Arregle et al., 2007), are more 
interested in honoring implicit labor contracts with their employees. Thus, in FFs, assuring 
the transmission of the value of the firm to future generations and family heirs (Anderson & 
Reeb 2003), may reveal a credible commitment that favor implicit contracts and FFs may 
offer a compensation package that involves lower pay, as shown by Sraer & Thesmar (2007) 
and Bassanini et al. (2013). 
Third, a rich literature confirms that HRM competences in designing reward systems are 
important and require professional practices. In FFs, which are typically smaller and have 
fewer resources than NFFs, the recourse to high-level technical competences for 
implementing incentive systems is often not affordable. As documented by some empirical 
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studies, FFs show a lower tendency to rely on formalized recruitment systems and 
performance appraisals (Cruz et al., 2011). 
In sum, under the goal of SEW preservation, more likely adopted by FFs, implicit rewards 
partially substitute explicit rewards, and FFs introduce PRP schemes less frequently; 
furthermore, even when these schemes are implemented, FFs pay low-wage incentive 
bonuses with respect to NFFs. Building on the above considerations, we propose the 
following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1a: FFs, which are supposed to adopt SEW as a frame of reference, are less likely 
than NFFs to adopt a reward system based on PRP. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: FFs, which are supposed to adopt SEW as a frame of reference, also 
compensate their employees with nonmonetary rewards; thus, even when FFs adopt PRP, 
they pay lower levels of PRP bonuses than do NFFs.  
However, there will be certain circumstances in which a pay policy based on implicit and 
non-monetary incentives may not be enough to guarantee a satisfactory firm performance 
and firm survival. In particular, we expect that in volatile environments, for instance due to 
fluctuations of demand, fixed wages are an inadequate response to the high degree of 
uncertainty that hits the firm. In such a case, wage flexibility, adopted with PRP, could 
represent a valuable response to economic fluctuations, thus mitigating the likely negative 
outcomes due to adverse shocks that may arrive at the firm. Under uncertainty, employees, 
anticipating that their firm may not have enough financial resources to pay fixed bonuses 
and to retain their job position, would also accept an incentive pay policy, based on PRP. 
Note that in our case, risk-averse employees would also likely accept payment in the form 
of these schemes; in the Italian economy, which features a two-tiered bargaining regime, 
firm-level agreements are only allowed to set upward deviations from wages agreed at the 
sectoral level. Thus, under positive demand shocks, firms could distribute wage incentives 
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linked to firm results, whereas in cases of adverse shocks, these wage premiums would be 
zero.  
The opportunity to introduce a PRP scheme, driven by the experience of volatile 
environments, could equally affect FFs and NFFs. However, for FFs, this opportunity would 
be particular interesting because it could represent a particular circumstance that exemplifies 
situations in which FFs “alternate between affective and economic frames of reference.” 
(Shukla et al., 2014). Thus, great uncertainty in market demand and the potential losses that 
might call into question the survival of the firm, could represent a ‘contingency variable’ 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011) capable of moderating the influence of SEW. In this case, FFs 
may be induced to adopt a decision more motivated by economic rationales rather than 
affective utility motives. If this hypothesis is confirmed by our estimates, we have a result 
that shows how the behavioral agency model might be useful to explain those circumstances 
in which purely economic motives coexist with affective, non-financial goals.  
In sum, we expect that FFs and NFFs that have in the past experienced a high degree of 
volatility in sales would be more willing to adopt PRP that links pay to their results as a 
strategy for obtaining improved performance. Formally stated: 
 
Hypothesis 2: FFs and NFFs that have experienced a high degree of uncertainty, measured 
by the past volatility of sales, show a high probability of adoption of PRP with respect to 
FFs and NFFs that operate in less uncertain environments. 
 
The second part of our analysis is focused on labor productivity and firm competitiveness 
(measured as the ratio of labor productivity to wages). Thus far, productivity and 
competitiveness differentials of family and non-family firms have been researched to a 
limited extent (Barth et al., 2005; Barbera & Moores, 2013). 
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On theoretical grounds, Fifiray et al. (2016) have suggested that independently of the SEW 
priorities, small FFs exhibit superior performance to that of small NFFs because the small 
size of FFs favor open communication, resource sharing, and mutual adaptation 
mechanisms. These traits help build ‘affect-based trust’, rooted in empathy and emotional 
bonds, and ‘cognition-based trust’, founded on performance-related cognitions such as 
competence, reliability and responsibility. However, when FFs grow in size, their priorities 
influence their leadership style and labor productivity. Fifiray et al. (2016) argue that when 
FFs rank as their primary objectives family identification, the reciprocal bonds within the 
family business and the renewal of family bonds, they are more likely to hire professional 
managers. In such a case, more advanced high performance work practices (HPWP) are 
adopted (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007), and the leadership style is based on the upgrading 
of higher levels of cognition-based trust, with positive consequences for labor productivity. 
In any case, what remains to be explored is the diverse efficacy of HPWP, in particular of 
employee incentive systems in FFs and NFFs firms. Incentives such as PRP may generate 
beneficial effects in the form of greater effort and commitment as well as better teamwork, 
greater workforce cooperation in the face of new technology and organizational changes, 
incentives to firm-specific human capital, and lower labor turnover (Prendergast, 1999).  
However, PRP are not immune to malfunctioning3. As argued by (Holmstrom, 1979), there 
is an “informativeness” problem because the performance measure does not always reflect 
the agents’ contribution to the principal’s interests. These conditions of asymmetric 
information make room for opportunistic behavior, with the consequence that agents have 
the ability to ‘game’ the compensation system (Baker, 1992). In contrast, family 
                                                           
3 One major issue of the incentive literature is that pay-for-performance may induce a significant trade-off 
between risk and incentives. Thus, the adoption of this type of scheme is limited by the ability of agents to 
handle risk (Prendergast, 1999). We do not consider this issue because in the Italian case, as said above, wage 
incentives may only be added to a fixed wage and do not expose employees to any risk.  
 10 
organizational social capital, founded within a climate of industrial relations, encourages 
loyalty, cooperative attitudes, self-control and fairness (Arregle et al., 2007). 
Consequently, we expect that, once PRP is adopted, family organizational social capital may 
be more effective in inducing higher productivity gains than those obtained in NFFs. This 
occurs because in FFs, employees respond with actions less oriented to ‘gaming’ the 
compensation system than what would occur in NFFs. A brief excursus of empirical research 
of FF attitudes toward employees is relevant for this conjecture. For instance, Stavrou & 
Swiercz (1998) document that FFs have a deep sense of responsibility toward their 
workforce. Nahapiet & Ghoshal (1998) show that in family firms, interpersonal relationships 
are characterized by stability and shared social networks. Block (2010) finds that FFs avoid 
deep jobs cuts because they care more about their reputation for social responsibility. 
Bammens et al. (2015) show that in family managed firms the work climate encourages the 
spontaneous engagement of employees in innovative work.  
Considered together, this fragmented evidence suggests that in FFs, ‘instrumental’ and 
‘normative’ reasons activate important enforcement mechanisms that promote internal 
informal sources of cooperation and innovation. These considerations lead us to formulate 
the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 3a: FFs, which are supposed to adopt SEW as a frame of reference, obtain higher 
positive effects in terms of labor productivity from the adoption of PRP than do NFFs. 
 
Finally, we expect that FFs – paying PRP bonuses in smaller amounts compared to NFFs 
(Hypothesis H1b) while at the same time achieving greater productivity gains (Hypothesis 
H3a) – obtain a greater positive differential between productivity gains and wage increases 
than do NFFs. Formally stated,  
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Hypothesis 3b: FFs, which are supposed to adopt SEW as a frame of reference, obtain higher 
positive effects in terms of competitiveness from the adoption of PRP than do NFFs. 
 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
3.1 Data 
The Employer and Employee Surveys (RIL) conducted by ISFOL provide a unique set of 
variables for estimating the role of PRP and testing the potential different effects for family 
and non-family firms. The data we use are obtained by merging information from this source 
and balance-sheet data from the Bureau Van Dijk AIDA archive for Italian firms.  
The RIL surveys offer information for a nationally representative sample of non-agricultural 
private sector partnerships and limited liability firms for two years, 2007 and 20104. The 
surveys collect a rich set of information about personnel organization, employment 
composition, industrial relations and other workplace characteristics5. For 2010, the survey 
also includes information on ownership/control and the management structure of firms6. This 
information enables us to distinguish between two groups of enterprises: i) family firms 
(FFs), those where a single family holds the majority of shares; and ii) non-family firms 
(NFFs), those where the majority of shares are not owned by a single family. Note that the 
first group of firms may be subdivided into two sub-groups: firms where a single family holds 
the majority of shares and family members run the firm, i.e., the family owned and managed 
                                                           
4 The availability of information for only two years is a limitation of our research. In any case, our data make 
it possible to have short panel data and go beyond a simple cross-section analysis. Moreover, the two years at 
our disposal allow us to consider periods before and during the Great Recession. Thus, our investigation takes 
into account all changes that have occurred within this interval. 
5  We use a stratified sample by size, sector, geographic area and legal form. This choice requires the 
construction of a ‘direct estimator’ to take into account differing probabilities from the inclusion of firms 
belonging to specific strata. This direct estimator is defined for each sample unit (firm) as the inverse of the 
probability of inclusion in the sample.  
6 We assumed that the same information holds for 2007. Therefore, both the family and non-family firm 
variables are time invariant. 
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firms (FMs) and the firms where a single family holds the majority of shares and professional 
managers run the firm (FNMs). In our case, as shown below, FMs are more than 90 percent 
of FFs, whereas only few firms, also in absolute terms, belong to the FNMs sub-group. Thus, 
in our analysis, we will not consider the FNMs sub-group.  
As for our dependent variables, labor productivity is measured by the value added per capita 
(LP), whereas wages are labor costs per capita (W). Both variables are used in log 
transformation. From their difference, ln (LP) and ln (W), it is possible to compute the 
indicator of competitiveness7. 
With respect to our key explanatory variable, in the RIL questionnaire, each firm was asked 
whether a performance-related pay scheme agreement (PRP) has been adopted. Thus, we 
created a dummy variable that indicates whether a PRP scheme exists for each year under 
study.  
Note that the Italian institutional wage setting is characterized by a two-tier bargaining 
regime. In this regime, first-level wage contracts at the sectoral level are intended to 
guarantee the purchasing power of wages and thus set wage increases linked to the target 
inflation rate; the second level of bargaining, at the firm level, distributes wage premiums, 
which may be of a fixed amount or linked to productivity or profit results. In this institutional 
setting, the discretional pay policies of each firm may be accomplished through the second 
level of bargaining, where the first level sets the same conditions for all firms that operate in 
the same sector. Thus, PRP wage premiums linked to firm results, negotiated at the second 
level of bargaining, are added to the base wage set in the first (sectoral) level, and they are 
equal to zero when firms do not gain positive results8.  
                                                           
7 In our analysis, we compute and use the labor costs, which include the taxes on labor and are a more standard 
measure for calculating competitiveness. However, taxes on labor are not affected by the ownership structure, 
and in the paper, we prefer to use the term wages, as in the related literature on monetary incentives. 
8 The Italian two-tier bargaining system is also prevailing in the majority of the Continental European countries. 
In this system, wage floors are imposed on firm level bargaining by the central or sectoral multi-employer 
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In addition, we have information on the occupational composition of the labor force within 
the firm (percentage of executives, blue-collar workers, white-collar workers, and trained 
workers), gender (percentage of women), type of contract (percentage of fixed-term 
contracts), and new hiring (percentage of newly hired workers).  
We also gather information on innovation by including two dummy variables that equal 1 if 
the firm adopted process and product innovations in the last three years and 0 otherwise. 
Concerning internationalization, we have a dummy variable that takes into account whether 
firms export (1 if the firm exported in the last three years and 0 otherwise).  
Furthermore, we gather information on lagged sales volatility, which is used as an instrument 
for PRP; thus, we introduced a dummy variable that equals 1 if the standard deviation of the 
firm sales for the 2002-2004 period is higher than the median standard deviation at the sector-
region level and 0 otherwise. 
We also included dummies for sectors and regions (NUTS 1) in which firms are located and 
a time dummy variable, 1 for 2010 and 0 otherwise. 
The longitudinal RIL-AIDA merged sample was restricted to those companies that disclose 
detailed accounts in accordance with the scheme of the 4th Directive CEE. We also excluded 
firms with less than five employees. This allows us to eliminate the self-employed as well as 
all small firms without an organizational structure, for which it makes sense to test the role 
of PRP. These selection criteria are consistent with those adopted in comparable studies (see 
Chrisman et al., 2004). Furthermore, we excluded firms that experienced mergers and 
acquisitions in the last three years9. Therefore, the sample that we use is an unbalanced panel 
of approximately 4,400 firms for 2007 and 2010.  
Detailed definitions of all variables mentioned above are reported in Table A1 (Appendix A).  
                                                           
agreements according to the so-called “favorability principle”. This principle prevents in peius firm-level 
agreements, thus workers may not be worse off than they are under the higher level bargaining. 
9 By excluding mergers and acquisitions we considered only firms that did not change ownership and control 
the observation period. 
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3.2 Descriptive statistics 
Our sample of listed and non-listed firms – with 5 or more employees – that operate in the 
non-agricultural sectors makes it possible to have a picture on a national scale of the pervasive 
presence of family business in the Italian economy. Table 1 shows that firms where a single 
family holds the majority of shares represent more than 78 percent of all Italian (listed and 
non-listed) enterprises. Indeed, 3,473 of firms have a single family who owns the majority of 
shares (FF), whereas there are only 983 of the other ownership types. Moreover, the share of 
firms owned and managed by a single family represents 92 percent of firms that are family 
owned, and these firms represent about 72 percent of all Italian firms in the market economy 
(with the exclusion of agriculture). Thus, the specific characteristic of the Italian case is not 
the prevalence of family-owned firms, which is common in many other countries, but the 
predominance of family-managed firms, which represent only a minority in other economies 
(according to the EFIGE database, in Spain one-third of businesses that are family owned are 
also family managed, and the corresponding figures are one-fourth in France and Germany 
and only one-tenth in the UK; see Bugamelli et al., 2012, p.15). 
Note that the descriptive statistics obtained for FFs and FMs, including means and 
proportions, are quite similar (see Table 1). In particular, concerning our key variable, PRP, 
we observe that a smaller fraction of FFs and FMs adopt this type of payment (9% and 8%) 
with respect to NFFs (27%), in conformity to Hypothesis 1a. Similar characteristics describe 
the portrait of FFs and FMs, and also the econometric results for FFs and FMs (not reported 
here for reasons of space but available upon request) are not significantly different. Thus, 
Table 1 is limited to tests for the significance of differences of descriptive statistics of FFs 
and NFFs (a test for equality of means/proportions and a Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test for the 
differences in distributions). 
Undoubtedly, dimensional aspects significantly contribute to explain the distribution of FFs 
and, as expected, the share of FFs decreases with firm size. Thus, of the total number of FFs, 
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46% are firms in the 5-14 employee class, whereas only 2% are in the 250+ class. In the NFFs 
group, the percentage of small firms is significantly lower (25% are firms in the 5-14 
employee class, and 9% are firms in the 250+ class).  
In terms of employees’ rewards we found that family firms pay lower wages  (FFs in log 
10.37 vs 10.56 in NFFs). This significant differential could be related to disparities in terms 
of human capital, as those described below, but could also reflect the role of family 
involvement (Hypothesis 1b), as found in other economies (Sraer & Thesmar, 2007 and 
Bassanini et al., 2013).   
In terms of performance, our non-financial indicators show that Italian FFs suffer a 
performance disadvantage in terms of per capita value added (10.78 vs 11.01) and 
competitiveness (0.41 vs 0.46). Both differentials, significant at the 1% level10, could be 
motivated by the dimensional aspect and might be coherent with other disparities, such as 
innovation strategies. For instance, our data show that FFs are less active than non-family 
enterprises in product innovation (51% of firms vs 54%). In addition, the statistical 
information on sectors shows that family business is more widespread in traditional industries 
(such as textiles and construction) and less diffused in some high-value added service sectors, 
such as finance and transport and communications. The sectoral dimension likely contributes 
to explain why the presence of FFs in international markets is, on average, comparable to that 
of NFFs; FFs, although smaller in size and thus less oriented toward international markets 
than large firms, are present in sectors where the Italian economy has some comparative 
advantages; a case in point is textiles.  
Interestingly, however, disparities in process innovation and internationalization appear of 
minor magnitude and not significant, whereas meaningful differences can be found for HRM 
practices and human capital. These aspects, unexplored thus far, at least for the Italian case, 
                                                           
10 All differentials for productivity, wages and competitiveness are also significant in the shapes of their 
distributions, as signaled by the Runk-Sum Test. 
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reveal a more significant divide with respect to that found for internationalization and 
innovation. 
In particular, for PRP, as noted above, we observe a low diffusion of PRP incentives in family 
firms. As in other countries, where FFs employ less complex HRM practices (Reid & Adam, 
2001; Koch et al., 2006), in the Italian economy, family firms less often adopt formalized 
wage agreements with employee representatives and reward systems based on performance, 
such as PRP. In accordance with this evidence, we also find in FFs less intense training 
activities (22% and 31% are the shares of trained employees in FFs and NFFs, respectively). 
Furthermore, significant disparities are found for human capital proxied by occupational 
categories. Indeed, we observe that FFs employ fewer executives compared to NFFs (a 
percentage over total employees of 4% vs 9% in NFFs) and fewer white-collar workers (36% 
vs 48%). 
The disparities we observe for HRM and human capital between FFs and NFFs raise the 
question whether the different diffusions of PRP (as well as training) reflect different degrees 
of organizational complexity due solely to resource availability, which is explainable in terms 
of the dimensional aspect. In such a case, the ‘size’ factor could represent a confounding 
factor for our analysis.  
Table 2 offers additional insights that seem to confute this conjecture. Indeed, when we 
analyze the various disparities between firms that adopt or do not adopt contingent rewards 
(PRP and Non-PRP, respectively), we find that within the total number of family firms with 
PRP, the percentage of smallest firms is higher than the percentage recorded for the largest 
firms (11% vs 9%). The opposite result is found in the subsample of NFFs, where the 
incidence of smallest enterprises with PRP is lower than that of the largest enterprises with 
PRP (5% vs 23%).  
[Insert Table 1-2] 
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Table 2 shows other unexpected results. For one of the variables of major interest, 
productivity, we observe that family firms that adopt PRP reveal a larger advantage in terms 
of labor productivity compared to family firms that do not adopt PRP (the differential in log 
is + 0.15). Interestingly, this advantage is not observable for the group of NFFs. This 
preliminary evidence supports Hypothesis 3a.  
For wages, Table 2 shows that the adoption of PRP, as expected, ensures higher rewards in 
both groups of firms. However, the wages paid by FFs remain lower with respect to NFFs, 
as suggested by Hypothesis 1b (10.54 vs 10.59)11. 
A related result of productivity and wage differentials is that obtained for competitiveness. 
For FFs, the degree of competitiveness achieved by firms that adopt PRP is almost the same 
as that obtained by FFs that do not adopt PRP (0.38 vs 0.41). When we consider NFFs, the 
correspondent differential (PRP and Non-PRP) is negative and significant (0.40 vs 0.48). At 
first sight, these data do not confirm Hypothesis 3b, at least in terms of the expected result 
for FFs, and deserves further investigation in the econometric analysis, where all possible 
confounding factors are taken into account. 
Finally, Table 2 also discloses that among firms adopting PRP, both FFs and NFFs, there is 
a significant and higher incidence of units that faced volatile environments in the past with 
respect to Non-PRP firms (69% vs 43% in FFs and 80% vs 56% in NFFs). This 
correspondence offers preliminary support for Hypothesis 2, which states that high sales 
volatility in the past could lead firms to introduce PRP schemes. 
The descriptive statistics above confirm the importance of taking into account all possible 
characteristics of firms that could affect the relationship between PRP and firm performance 
(productivity and competitiveness). Beyond these descriptive statistics, what remains to be 
discovered is the combined role of governance structure (ownership) and of governance 
                                                           
11 Both means and distributions are significantly different at the 1% level. Results are available upon request. 
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devices (PRP and non PRP) to obtain a comprehensive representation of wage policies and 
their efficacy for competitiveness in Italy. 
4 Econometric analysis 
In this section, we study the effects of PRP on labor productivity, wages and competitiveness 
separately for family and non-family firms. We take into account all possible confounding 
factors affecting this relationship, i.e., all other characteristics of firms discussed above (labor 







To investigate the relationship mentioned above, we started with pooled OLS and standard 
quantile regressions (Koenker & Basset, 1978)12. The quantile regression (QR) technique 
makes it possible to estimate the PRP impact on different parts of the dependent variable 
distributions and thus to have information not only about their conditional means. However, 
both OLS and standard QR suffer from problems due to individual unobserved heterogeneity 
and endogeneity. For example, time invariant unobserved factors (i.e., specific firms’ traits 
that we do not control for) may obscure and distort estimates of the relationships we would 
like to test. Furthermore, there may be a spurious relationship between PRP and productivity 
or between PRP and wages; this typically arises if more productive firms or firms that pay 
higher wages are more likely to adopt PRP. Our main interest is to address these two problems 
by means of fixed effect and instrumental variable QR. 
                                                           
12To save space, we do not report tables for these preliminary regressions. The results are available on request.  
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Concerning individual unobserved heterogeneity, we use the Canay (2011) method and 
perform a fixed effects quantile regression (FEQR). For possible PRP endogeneity, two 
methods have been used: i) the traditional Two-Stage Least Absolute Deviation Estimator 
(IVQR_2LAD) of Amemya (1982) and ii) the Quantile Treatment Effect Estimator of Abadie 
et al. (2002) (IVQR_AAI).  
The choice of instrument is motivated by the same arguments offered to support Hypothesis 
2. Briefly, we conjecture that under volatile environments, firms are more likely to tend to 
introduce PRP schemes as a valuable response to economic fluctuations. From an 
econometric point of view, the high volatility of sales at the firm level measured as the above-
median standard deviation and recorded over the period 2002-2004 (long before 2007), may 
be a valid instrument because it is a proxy of uncertainty (Bloom, 2009). Furthermore, this 
variable is expected to randomly affect the probability that firms introduce PRP schemes 
without directly affecting the three dependent variables (productivity, wages and 
competitiveness). Further details on the econometric techniques mentioned above are 
reported in appendix B. 
4.2 Results 
Table 3 shows the main results for FFs obtained with the FEQR that corrects for unobserved 
heterogeneity. Part of the differences among firms could be due to a number of sources of 
unobserved heterogeneity. Indeed, even the group of family firms is not a monolithic reality 
(Miller et al., 2010). This is because in FFs, the protection of affective endowments has 
multiple facets to which the single firm assigns its own priorities. For instance, the 
enjoyment of family influence over the firm, reputation and family image, and the renewal 
of family bonds through dynastic succession represent distinct dimensions of affective 
endowments, to which each family firm assigns its own priorities (Berrone et al., 2012). 
However, these different dimensions and their weights in firms’ objectives function may be 
difficult to measure. To take into account potential biases due to these and other unobserved 
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factors that affect family and non-family firms and that cannot be captured by other controls, 
we adopt fixed effects estimates. These estimates are obtained by including all controls for 
firm characteristics (presented in Tables 1 and 2)13 and other dummies to control for time, 
sector and geographical (NUTS1) factors, which likely influence the dependent variables 
(see Tables 3 and 4). 
[Insert Table 3-4] 
The FEQR results show a significant positive association of PRP with labor productivity for 
the group of family firms along almost the entire distribution (Table 3, Panel A). The 
adoption of PRP is on average associated with a 5.6% rise in value added per employee. 
Conversely, for the group of non-family firms (Table 4, Panel A) the role of PRP in labor 
productivity is broadly non-significant14. This confirms that family ownership (and family 
management) matters and that FFs achieve more gains from the adoption of PRP, as 
conjectured by Hypothesis 3a.  
If we compare the FEQR results obtained for wages, we find that in family firms, the 
adoption of PRP gives rise to fewer monetary incentives for employees than in non-family 
firms (see Panel B of Tables 3 and 4). These findings, obtained by controlling for human 
capital and skills, confirms that FFs, likely because they offer greater job security and more 
intrinsic incentives, pay less generous monetary incentive pay, such as PRP, than do NFFs, 
as formulated by Hypothesis 1b.  
Noticeably, when we consider the third dependent variable, we find that family firms achieve 
higher positive effects from PRP in term of competitiveness than do non-family firms. As 
shown by Panel C of Table 3, in the FF group, PRP is associated with a competitive-
                                                           
13 The only exception is the variable High-Sales volatility, which we only use as an instrument in the 
instrumental variable QR. 
14 All these results, together with the results obtained for wages and competitiveness (panels B and C), are 
perfectly coherent, even though the magnitude of the coefficients is lower, with the findings of pooled OLS 
and standard QR estimations (not reported here for reasons of space). 
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enhancing role, and this positive link is rather uniform in all quantiles. It means that in family 
firms, the productivity effect of PRP appears to dominate the wage effect, and a high degree 
of competitiveness emerges as result. On the contrary, from non-family firms we infer that 
PRP fosters employee rewards, but productivity does not increase (see Panel A of Table 4). 
Therefore, the efficiency enhancement role of PRP is absent, or even negative, in non-family 
firms (see Panel C of Table 4). Thus, in contrast to what we obtain in the descriptive 
statistics, the econometric analysis unequivocally confirms Hypothesis 3b. 
PRP schemes are often expensive to implement and are more likely to be affordable only for 
high-performing firms. Thus, firms with a higher degree of productivity or competitiveness 
may have a higher probability of adopting a PRP scheme. As discussed above, we take into 
account this endogeneity problem by introducing an instrument that influences the 
probability of adopting PRP schemes but at the same time randomly affects the sample firms. 
This instrument, as said, is a proxy for uncertainty, captured by the volatility of sales at the 
firm level. The probit regression results, shown in the appendix (Table A.2), highlight that 
high sales volatility positively and significantly influences the probability of adopting a PRP 
scheme in the group of FFs. Thus the instrument seems appropriate and our identification 
strategy valid, at least for family firms, confirming Hypothesis 2 only for the FF group. It 
may be argued that uncertainty and volatile environments are particularly effective for 
marking a tipping point for FFs, inducing them to introduce more formal wage schemes 
(PRP) and place more importance on an economic frame of reference. We do not observe 
the same thing for NFFs (for these firms, sales volatility has no significant effect on PRP 
adoption; see Table A.2).  
Interestingly, the IV estimates offer an additional validation of Hypotheses 3a and 3b and 
confirm the positive effects of PRP on productivity and competitiveness only in the group 
of FFs, whereas for NFFs, any evidence of a positive link is not detectable (see Tables 5 and 
6).  
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[Insert Table 5-6] 
 
Finally, a comparison of the coefficients of PRP in terms of wages does not fully support 
Hypothesis 1b because the impact of these schemes on remunerations is higher in FFs than 
in NFFs. In any case, what appears remarkable is that also controlling for the endogeneity 
of PRP, in family firms, PRP schemes contribute to enhancing the degree of competitiveness. 




Discussion and Conclusions 
In this paper, we evaluated the role of performance related pay in family firms, 
performing a comparison with their non-family counterparts. Our evidence based on the 
Italian experience shows that family firms make less use of this incentive scheme. However, 
we also found robust evidence that FFs, when using these contingent rewards to encourage 
commitment and motivation on the part of their workforce, obtain greater gains in terms of 
labor productivity with respect to NFFs. This efficiency-enhancing role of PRP, coupled with 
the moderate influence of these schemes on wage incentives, enables family firms to achieve 
significant gains in terms of competitiveness. Conversely, NFFs, pay workers higher wages, 
but these wages do not translate into greater labor efficiency. For these firms, PRP premiums 
more than compensate for the (non-significant) benefits in terms of labor productivity, with 
a final negative balance on their degree of competitiveness.  
The arguments offered in this paper suggest that in FFs, agents are less inclined to act 
opportunistically and ‘to game’ the wage incentive system. The empirical confirmation of 
these hypotheses, obtained with our estimates, is in line with the idea that in FFs, the presence 
of ‘binding social ties’, which is a key normative dimension of SEW and is based on the 
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principles of reciprocity, ensures a sense of belonging and commitment on the part of 
employees to the firm. Furthermore, the desire to maintain control and influence, coupled 
with a strong concern for family identity and a long-term sense of dynasty, represent 
instrumental motives that induce family owners to care about their stakeholders and ensure 
their care and job tenure. Our research offers two major contributions. First, with respect to 
the family firm literature and the recent field of the SEW, our analysis of wage incentives is 
a first step to evaluating how the preservation of affective utilities, which typify family firms, 
translates into distinct employee reward systems, as suggested by Cruz et al. (2011). This 
topic, which has been overlooked in the literature, also has managerial implications. Advisors 
and consultants involved in HRM practices should be interested in empirical results dealing 
with the consequences of implementing and adapting incentive pay schemes for employees 
in the specific context of family firms. In addition, although Italy appears as special case in 
Europe, due to the prevalence of family owned and managed firms, there are also similarities 
in terms of two-tier bargaining systems among this country and other Continental EU 
countries. These similarities suggest that it could be interesting to explore whether the 
relationships between PRP and competitiveness also hold for other EU countries, especially 
those characterized by ownership concentration in family hands. 
Second, concerning the vast research on the theme of competitiveness, the analysis of 
incentive pay as a function of family involvement may enrich the incentive literature, which 
with few exceptions has only rarely focused on the family (and non-family) dimension 
(Bloom & Van Reeenen, 2007; Barbera & Moores, 2013).  
Our results, however, also reveal a controversial issue. If wage incentives, such as PRP, 
are beneficial for family business, it is legitimate to ask why there are so few family firms 
that use this type of incentive. Our suggestion is that it is exactly these kinds of intricate and 
puzzling issues that may be explained by the SEW view. In FFs, both parties (employers and 
employees) attach value to the relationship, “beyond the economic value created by 
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transaction” (Gomez Meja et al., 2001, p. 82). This peculiar characteristic fits well with a 
wide diffusion of relational contracts, intrinsic incentives and moderate compensation 
policies that typify FFs, as found in other studies (Gomez-Meja et al. 2001; Carrasco & 
Sánchez-Marin, 2007; Sraer & Thesmar, 2007). However, there are contingency variables 
that may moderate the influence of affective utilities on managerial decisions. The literature 
has shown that under conditions of firm hazard, when economic conditions are declining, the 
perception of potential losses induces the family to change the frame of reference, accepting 
the socioemotional losses while ensuring the survival of the firm (see Gomez- Meja et al., 
2011 for a review). In our analysis, we have suggested, at least as a preliminary hypothesis, 
that the contingent variable is the degree of uncertainty regarding market demand. 
Major challenges for future research are grounded in the current limitations of our 
study. First, additional efforts are required to accurately isolate the specific contingent 
variables that may influence the frame of references of FFs, particularly in relation to the 
largely unexplored issue of the driving forces behind the adoption of wage policies in FFs. 
Moreover, future research should analyze which emotional dimensions of SEW may amplify 
relationship conflicts in labor relations as well as the role of employee representatives in 
establishing priorities among different SEW dimensions.  
Additional research should also introduce psychometric instruments to measure the 
SEW construct, for instance, including new questionnaires in surveys to identify the different 
dimensions of SEW. In these surveys, some of the concepts proposed thus far in the family 
firms literature, such as “altruism, fairness, justice and generosity” (Berrone et al., 2012, p. 
265), should be mapped into specific bundles of High Performance Work Practices. 
Finally, additional attention to controlling for the endogeneity of family ownership and 
management to obtain more robust and credible results remains an important issue in the 
literature, as demonstrated recently by Amit and Villalonga (2014). This remains a 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics: Family owned, managed and non-family firms  
(Sample means and proportions) 
Source: RIL-AIDA data. Note: FF=Family owned firms; FM=Family owned and managed firms; NFF=Non-Family firms. (1/0) stands 
for binary variable. Test for differences between means and proportions: *** significant at .01 level; ** significant at .05 level; *significant at 
.10 level. Runk-sum test, H0: FF and NFF have the same distribution. The number of observations refers to maximum. All statistics 
refer to the pooled sample (2007 and 2010).
Variables FF FM NFF 
Test 




(FF  vs NFF) 
 (means/proportions) (differences) (p_values) 
Key dependent and explanatory variables   
Ln(LP) 10.78 10.77 11.01 -0.23*** <0.01 
Ln(W) 10.37 10.36 10.56 -0.18*** <0.01 
Ln(LP)-Ln(W) 0.41 0.41 0.46 -0.05*** <0.01 
PRP (1/0) 0.09 0.08 0.27 -0.18***  
Labor force characteristics   
New hirings (share) 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.01 0.027 
Executives (share) 0.04 0.03 0.09 -0.05*** <0.01 
White collars (share) 0.36 0.35 0.48 -0.12*** <0.01 
Blue collars (share) 0.61 0.62 0.43 0.17*** <0.01 
Females (share) 0.34 0.33 0.37 -0.03*** <0.01 
Fixed-term contracts (share) 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.01*** 0.420 
Trained workers (share) 0.22 0.22 0.31 -0.09*** <0.01 
Firm Characteristics   
Size: 5 ≦n of employees<15 (1/0) 0.46 0.46 0.25 0.21***  
Size: 15 ≦n employees<50 (1/0) 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.00  
Size: 50 ≦n employees<250 (1/0) 0.16 0.16 0.30 -0.14***  
Size: n of employees ≧250 (1/0) 0.02 0.01 0.09 -0.07***  
High-Sales-Volatility (1/0) 0.46 0.46 0.62 -0.16***  
Ln (K/L) 10.10 10.09 10.11 -0.02 0.983 
product innovation (1/0) 0.51 0.51 0.54 -0.04***  
process innovation (1/0) 0.42 0.42 0.44 -0.01  
foreign market (1/0) 0.27 0.28 0.26 0.02  
Text., Wear. Apparel, Food (1/0) 0.15 0.15 0.10 0.05***  
Other Man., Min., Utilities (1/0) 0.34 0.35 0.31 0.03***  
Constructions (1/0) 0.13 0.13 0.05 0.08***  
Trade, hotels, restaurants (1/0) 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.02*  
Transp. and comm. (1/0) 0.04 0.04 0.11 -0.07***  
Intermed., other bus. serv. (1/0) 0.09 0.09 0.17 -0.08***  
Educ., health and soc. serv. (1/0) 0.11 0.11 0.14 -0.03***  
North- West (1/0) 0.32 0.32 0.38 -0.06***  
North-East (1/0) 0.26 0.27 0.29 -0.02**  
Centre (1/0) 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.00  
South (1/0) 0.21 0.20 0.13 0.08***  
No. Observations 6874 6326 1901   







Table 2 Descriptive Statistics: Family and non-family firms and PRP  
(Sample means and proportions) 
 Source: RIL-AIDA data. Note: FF=Family owned firms; FM=Family owned and managed firms; NFF=Non-Family firms firms. (1/0) 
stands for binary variable. Test for differences between means and proportions: *** significant at .01 level; ** significant at .05 level; *significant 
at .10 level. Runk-sum test, H0: FF and NFF have the same distribution. The number of observations refers to maximum. Statistics refer to 
the pooled sample (2007 and 2010). In order to save space we omitted statistics for sectors and macro-regions. The results are available 
upon request.



















 (means/prop.) (Diff.) ( p values) (means/prop.) (Diff.) ( p values) 
Key dependent variables  Key dependent variables  
Ln(LP) 10.91 10.76 0.15*** <0.01 10.99 11.02 -0.03 0.703 
Ln(W) 10.54 10.36 0.18*** <0.01 10.59 10.54 0.05** <0.01 
Ln(LP)-Ln(W) 0.38 0.41 -0.02 0.021 0.40 0.48 -0.07** 0.049 
Labor force characteristics  Labor force characteristics  
New hirings (share) 0.08 0.12 -0.04*** 0.015 0.10 0.11 -0.02** 0.341 
Executives (share) 0.05 0.03 0.02*** <0.01 0.10 0.08 0.02** <0.01 
White collars (share) 0.30 0.36 -0.06*** 0.013 0.42 0.50 -0.08*** <0.01 
Blue collars (share) 0.65 0.60 0.04*** 0.323 0.48 0.42 0.07*** <0.01 
Females (share) 0.28 0.34 -0.06*** <0.01 0.32 0.38 -0.06*** <0.01 
Fixed-term contracts (share) 0.07 0.09 -0.02*** 0.797 0.07 0.08 -0.02** 0.319 
Trained workers (share) 0.29 0.22 0.07*** <0.01 0.41 0.28 0.14*** <0.01 
Firm Characteristics  Firm Characteristics  
Size: 5 ≦n of employees<15 (1/0) 0.11 0.49 -0.37***  0.05 0.32 -0.27***  
Size: 15 ≦n employees<50 (1/0) 0.38 0.37 0.01  0.23 0.41 -0.18***  
Size: 50 ≦n employees<250 (1/0) 0.42 0.14 0.28***  0.49 0.23 0.26***  
Size: n of employees ≧250 (1/0) 0.09 0.01 0.08***  0.23 0.03 0.19***  
High-Sales-Volatility (1/0) 0.69 0.43 0.26***  0.80 0.56 0.24***  
Ln (K/L) 10.42 10.06 0.36*** <0.01 10.33 10.03 0.30** <0.01 
product innovation (1/0) 0.61 0.50 0.12***  0.66 0.50 0.16***  
process innovation (1/0) 0.58 0.41 0.18***  0.58 0.39 0.19***  
foreign market (1/0) 0.47 0.26 0.21***  0.36 0.22 0.14***  
No. Observations 586 6176   506 1360   






Table 3 Quantile Fixed effects estimations Family Firms 
 Panel A Dep. Var. : Ln (Labor productivity) 
 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 FE 
PRP 0.026 0.044*** 0.056*** 0.066*** 0.079*** 0.056* 
 [0.025] [0.013] [0.000] [0.012] [0.024] [0.028] 
Year 2010 -0.096*** -0.023*** -0.043*** -0.031*** -0.049*** -0.087*** 
 [0.013] [0.006] [0.000] [0.005] [0.009] [0.012] 
Labor Force characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro-regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 9.349*** 9.506*** 9.476*** 9.511*** 9.567*** 9.476*** 
 [0.098] [0.051] [0.000] [0.045] [0.080] [0.297] 
Pseudo R2 0.5876 0.6973 0.7962 0.8104 0.7296  
N of firms (panels) 2637 
N of Obs 3979 
Panel B  Dep. Var. : Ln (wages) 
 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 FE 
PRP 0.012* 0.007* 0.002*** 0.008 -0.002 0.002 
 [0.006] [0.004] [0.000] [0.007] [0.009] [0.025] 
Year 2010 -0.045*** -0.041*** -0.035*** -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.035*** 
 [0.007] [0.004] [0.000] [0.004] [0.007] [0.009] 
Labor Force characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro-regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 9.446*** 9.477*** 9.460*** 9.487*** 9.575*** 9.460*** 
 [0.045] [0.026] [0.000] [0.025] [0.047] [0.170] 
Pseudo R2 0.650 0.738 0.812 0.817 0.741  
N of firms (panels) 2643 
N of Obs 4000 
Panel C Dep. Var. : ln(Labor productivity) – ln(wages) 
 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 FE 
PRP 0.038* 0.033*** 0.047*** 0.052*** 0.040** 0.047 
 [0.019] [0.009] [0.000] [0.007] [0.018] [0.031] 
Year 2010 -0.060*** -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.029*** -0.034*** -0.054*** 
 [0.011] [0.011] [0.000] [0.006] [0.010] [0.011] 
Labor Force characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro-regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.060 -0.083* 0.047*** 0.080*** -0.156*** 0.047 
 [0.201] [0.047] [0.000] [0.039] [0.075] [0.204] 
Pseudo R2 0.409 0.543 0.668 0.665 0.537  
N of firms (panels) 2637 
N of Obs. 3979 
Notes: .*** significant at .01 level; ** significant at .05 level; *significant at .10 level. boostrapped standard errors with 100 
replications in square brackets. Q10, Q25, Q50, Q75, Q90 are the percentiles of the distribution. FE is the conditional 
mean fixed effects estimation.  
Labor Force characteristics include: shares of blue-, white-collars and executives; shares of fixed term contracts, 
trained workers and females.  
Firm characteristics include: firm’s size, capital intensity (Ln(K/L); share of new hirings; product and process 
innovation; export. 











Table 4 Quantile Fixed effects estimations Non-Family Firms 
 Panel A Dep. Var. : Ln (Labor productivity) 
 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 FE 
PRP -0.047 -0.020 -0.012*** -0.001 0.037 -0.012 
 [0.034] [0.013] [0.000] [0.014] [0.036] [0.053] 
Year 2010 -0.035 -0.017 -0.006*** 0.026* 0.009 -0.006 
 [0.028] [0.011] [0.000] [0.014] [0.028] [0.026] 
Labor Force characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro-regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 10.262*** 10.442*** 10.497*** 10.524*** 10.472 10.498*** 
 [0.198] [0.075] [0.001] [0.072] [0.160] [0.449] 
Pseudo R2 0.454 0.595 0.693 0.657 0.591  
N of firms (panels) 775 
N of Obs 1214 
Panel B  Dep. Var. : Ln (wages) 
 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 FE 
PRP 0.036*** 0.043*** 0.054*** 0.044*** 0.050*** 0.054 
 [0.012] [0.006] [0.001] [0.006] [0.016] [0.035] 
Year 2010 -0.023* -0.028*** -0.004*** -0.005 -0.000 -0.004 
 [0.012] [0.005] [0.000] [0.007] [0.014] [0.017] 
Labor Force characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro-regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 10.335*** 10.357*** 10.355*** 10.380*** 10.453*** 10.355*** 
 [0.091] [0.036] [0.002] [0.033] [0.100] [0.290] 
Pseudo R2 0.600 0.680 0.738 0.718 0.654  
N of firms (panels) 779 
N of Obs 1223 
Panel C Dep. Var. : ln(Labor productivity) – ln(wages) 
 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 FE 
PRP -0.058*** -0.053*** -0.069*** -0.064*** -0.094*** -0.069 
 [0.019] [0.010] [0.000] [0.028] [0.023] [0.045] 
Year 2010 -0.006 -0.009 -0.006****** 0.028*** 0.031** -0.006 
 [0.022] [0.011] [0.000] [0.09] [0.016] [0.022] 
Labor Force characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro-regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.039 0.059 0.039*** 0.005 -0.010 -0.080 
 [0.378] [0.064] [0.001] [0.050] [0.118] [0.136] 
Pseudo R2 0.394 0.516 0.621 0.567 0.478  
N of firms (panels) 775 
N of Obs. 1214 
Notes: .*** significant at .01 level; ** significant at .05 level; *significant at .10 level. boostrapped standard errors with 100 
replications in square brackets. Q10, Q25, Q50, Q75, Q90 are the percentiles of the distribution. FE is the conditional mean 
fixed effects estimation.  
Labor Force characteristics include: shares of blue-, white-collars and executives; shares of fixed term contracts, trained 
workers and females. 
Firm characteristics include: firm’s size, capital intensity (Ln(K/L); share of new hirings; product and process innovation; 
export. 













Table 5 IV Quantile Regressions: Effects of PRP on Productivity, Labor Costs and Competitiveness in Family 
Firms 
 Panel A Dep. Var. : Ln (Labor productivity) 
 IVQR_AAI IV_2LAD 
 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 Q50 
PRP 0.732*** 0.563*** 0.515*** 0.642*** 0.761*** 0.492*** 
 [0.221] [0.086] [0.168] [0.159] [0.235] [0.080] 
Year 2010 -0.113 -0.046 -0.087 -0.098 -0.112 -0.148*** 
 [0.121] [0.097] [0.135] [0.155] [0.239] [0.023] 
Labor Force characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro-regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 10.563*** 10.189*** 10.223*** 10.207*** 10.054*** 11.007*** 
 [0.658] [0.327] [1.668] [1.111] [1.843] [0.196] 
Pseudo R2      0.180 
N of Obs 2441 2467 
Panel B  Dep. Var. : Ln (wages) 
 IVQR_AAI IV_2LAD 
 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 Q50 
PRP 0.302** 0.251*** 0.205** 0.245** 0.266 0.123*** 
 [0.141] [0.090] [0.081] [0.111] [0.214] [0.037] 
Year 2010 0.060 0.037 -0.008 -0.006 0.009 -0.038*** 
 [0.089] [0.098] [0.114] [0.171] [0.218] [0.012] 
Labor Force characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro-regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 10.833*** 11.026*** 11.292*** 11.902*** 11.916*** 11.354*** 
 [2.111] [1.038] [1.522] [0.880] [1.847] [0.117] 
Pseudo R2      0.240 
N of Obs 2454 2480 
Panel C Dep. Var. : Ln (Labor productivity)- Ln (wages) 
 IVQR_AAI IV_2LAD 
 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 Q50 
PRP 0.508*** 0.349*** 0.301*** 0.403*** 0.496 0.325*** 
 [0.125] [0.103] [0.100] [0.094] [0.294] [0.051] 
Year 2010 -0.078 -0.044 -0.061 -0.087 -0.109 -0.096*** 
 [0.092] [0.098] [0.091] [0.097] [0.252] [0.019] 
Labor Force characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro-regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -2.026*** -1.870*** -0.998 -0.891 -0.877 -0.347*** 
 [1.034] [0.507] [1.169] [0.605] [2.208] [0.133] 
Pseudo R2      0.100 
N of Obs. 2441 2467 
Notes: IVQR_AAI is the Quantile Treatment Effect Estimator of Abadie et al. (2002); IV_2LAD is the traditional Two-
Stages Least Absolute Deviation Estimator of Amemya (1982). Q10, Q25, Q50, Q75, Q90 are the percentiles of the 
distribution.  
Labor Force characteristics include: shares of blue-, white-collars and executives; shares of fixed term contracts, trained 
workers and females. 
Firm characteristics include: firm’s size, capital intensity (Ln(K/L); share of new hirings; product and process innovation; 
export. 
Results for all control variables included in both Labor force and Firm characteristics are available upon request. 
.*** significant at .01 level; ** significant at .05 level; *significant at .10 level.  





Table 6 IV Quantile Regressions: Effects of PRP on Productivity, Labor Costs and Competitiveness in 
Nonfamily Firms 
 Panel A Dep. Var. : Ln (Labor productivity) 
 IVQR_AAI IV_2LAD 
 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 Q50 
PRP 0.311 0.205* 0.193 0.160 0.200 0.696*** 
 [0.325] [0.104] [0.139] [0.120] [0.201] [0.174] 
Year 2010 0.033 0.027 0.024 -0.025 -0.106 -0.082** 
 [0.214] [0.094] [0.124] [0.171] [0.228] [0.034] 
Labor Force characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro-regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 10.794*** 12.041*** 12.112*** 11.940*** 10.940*** 13.413*** 
 [1.931] [0.542] [0.722] [0.798] [1.213] [0.434] 
Pseudo R2      0.180 
N of Obs 809 817 
Panel B  Dep. Var. : Ln (wages) 
 IVQR_AAI IV_2LAD 
 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 Q50 
PRP 0.286* 0.188* 0.178* 0.151 0.060 0.288*** 
 [0.159] [0.110] [0.089] [0.100] [0.223] [0.103] 
Year 2010 0.102 0.079 0.019 0.036 -0.016 -0.011 
 [0.079] [0.080] [0.055] [0.057] [0.077] [0.018] 
Labor Force characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro-regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 11.017*** 11.296*** 11.717*** 11.771*** 11.707*** 12.496*** 
 [0.463] [0.665] [0.479] [0.470] [0.811] [0.200] 
Pseudo R2      0.240 
N of Obs 813 821 
Panel C Dep. Var. : Ln (Labor productivity)- Ln (wages) 
 IVQR_AAI IV_2LAD 
 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 Q50 
PRP 0.309 0.165 0.162* 0.143 0.119 0.485*** 
 [0.393] [0.114] (0.087] (0.101] (0.179] (0.128] 
Year 2010 -0.019 0.003 -0.031 -0.006 -0.026 -0.067** 
 [0.141] [0.081] (0.082] (0.113] (0.133] (0.030] 
Labor Force characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro-regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.267 0.379 0.327 0.239 0.092 0.750*** 
 [0.593] [0.384] (0.402] (0.452] (0.681] (0.242] 
Pseudo R2      0.097 
N of Obs. 809 817 
Notes: IVQR_AAI is the Quantile Treatment Effect Estimator of Abadie et al. (2002); IV_2LAD is the traditional Two-
Stages Least Absolute Deviation Estimator of Amemya (1982). Q10, Q25, Q50, Q75, Q90 are the percentiles of the 
distribution.  
Labor Force characteristics include: shares of blue-, white-collars and executives; shares of fixed term contracts, trained 
workers and females. 
Firm characteristics include: firm’s size, capital intensity (Ln(K/L); share of new hirings; product and process innovation; 
export. 
Results for all control variables included in both Labor force and firm characteristics are available upon request. 
.*** significant at .01 level; ** significant at .05 level; *significant at .10 level.  











Table A.1 Description of the Variables 
Variable Definition and Source 
Key dependent variables 
Ln(LP) 
Labour Productivity: Log of value-added per number of employees 
(source AIDA)  
Ln(W) Wages: Log of wage bill per number of employees (source AIDA)  
Ln(LP)-Ln(W) Competitiveness: measured as LP/W  
PRP (1/0) 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm adopts a PRP scheme, 0 
otherwise (source RIL survey). 
Labor force characteristics 
New hirings (share) New hired workers to total employees (source RIL survey) 
Executives (share) Managers and supervisors to total employees (source RIL survey) 
White collars (share) White collar workers to total employees (source RIL survey) 
Blue collars (share) Manual workers to total employees (source RIL survey) 
Females (share) Women to total employees (source RIL survey) 
Fixed-term contracts (share) Fixed-term workers to total employees (source RIL survey) 
Trained workers (share) Trained workers to total employees (source RIL survey) 
Firm Characteristics 
Size: 5 ≦n of employees<15 (1/0) 1: included in the class, 0: otherwise (source RIL survey) 
Size: 15 ≦n employees<50 (1/0) 1: included in the class, 0: otherwise (source RIL survey) 
Size: 50 ≦n employees<250 (1/0) 1: included in the class, 0: otherwise (source RIL survey) 
Size: n of employees ≧250 (1/0) 1: included in the class, 0: otherwise (source RIL survey) 
High-Sales-Volatility (1/0) 
1: standard deviation of the 2002-2004 sales higher than the 
median standard deviation of the sector-region, 0: otherwise 
(source AIDA). 
Ln (K/L) Log of capital stock per number of employees (source AIDA)  
Process Innovation 
1: presence of process innovation, 0: otherwise (source RIL 
survey). 
Product Innovation 
1: presence of product innovation, 0: otherwise (source RIL 
survey). 
Foreign market 1: exporting firms, 0: otherwise (source RIL survey). 
Macro-regions (NUTS1) 
1: the firm is localised in one of the NUTS1 regions shown in 
Table 1, 0: otherwise (source RIL survey) 
Sectors 
1: the firm is localised in one of the sectors shown in Table 1, 0: 













Table A.2. IV 2_LAD: First Stage (Probit Model) 
Dependent Variable: PRP Family Firms No Family Firms 
High Sales Volatility [1/0] 0.256*** 0.226 
 
[0.084] [0.147] 
Year 2010 0.129*   0.121 
 
[0.076] [0.109] 
Labor Force characteristics Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes 
Macro-regions Yes Yes 
Sectors Yes Yes 
Constant -0.164 -1.737**  
 
[0.635] [0.883] 
Observations 2454 813 
Notes: standard errors are bootstrapped with 100 replications in parentheses.  
*** significant at .01 level; ** significant at .05 level; *significant at .10 level. 
Labor Force characteristics: blue-, white-collars and executives; fixed term 
contracts, trained workers and females. 
Firm characteristics: firm’s size, capital intensity (Ln(K/L); new hirings; product and 
process innovation; export. 



















We estimate the effect of PRP on labor productivity by adopting an augmented production 
function that includes the dummy variable (PRP) and other controls for firm characteristics 







= 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∙ 𝑃𝑅𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆 ∙ 𝑙𝑛 (
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 is the (log of) valued added per employee, is the (log of) physical 
capital per employee, PRP indicates the adoption of PRP. The vector Fit denotes controls for 
workforce composition and for firm characteristics (for more details see Tables 1, 2 and A.1 
in the appendix). The parameter 𝜇𝑠  denotes sector specific fixed effects, 𝛾𝑗  regional 
(NUTS1_level) fixed effects for macro-areas,  represents year fixed effects and  is the 
error term capturing the idiosyncratic component of labor productivity. The same regression 






and competitiveness, 𝑙𝑛(𝑊)𝑖,𝑡. 
As mentioned in section 4.1, we mainly focus on fixed effect and instrumental variable QRs.  
The fixed effect quantile regression (FEQR), has been performed by means of the two step 
Canay (2011) estimator, that allows us to calculate the firm-level fixed effects in a first step 
panel data regression (within estimator) and then to purge the dependent variable from them 
in a second step quantile regression. 
The IVQR_2LAD is essentially a two-step median regression. In the first step we carry out a 
probit regression of PRP (our endogenous binary variable) on the binary instrument (sales 















in a standard quantile regression (Amemya, 1982) 15. The reasons for which we can only limit 
to the conditional median with this method are discussed in Chernozhukov &Hansen (2005) 
and Melly (2004). However, the IVQR_2LAD allows us to directly observe the test of the 
relevance of the instrument, that is the correlation between high sales volatility and PRP 
shown in Table A.2.  At the same time we obtain econometric evidence about the influence 
of sales volatility on PRP, as hypothesized in H2. 
The IVQR_AAI estimator is coherent with a treatment effect approach and can be adopted 
only when both the endogenous variable and instrument are binary variables (as in our case). 
Specific weights combining the latter are estimated according the routine performed by 
Frölich & Melly (2013). It is worth noting that good instruments are expected to be valid if 
i) can predict the adoption of PRP and ii) are orthogonal with respect to our dependent 
variables (productivity, wages and competitiveness). The first property of the instrument is 
tested in the first stage of the IVQR_2LAD method (see Table A.2). As regards the second 
property (orthogonality condition), one should note that the equation is perfectly identified 
because we only have one instrument and one endogenous variable. Thus, no test is available 
to prove orthogonality. Following Abadie et al., (2002) and Frölich & Melly, (2010; 2013), 
the instrument-error independence is conceivable when it is plausible to justify the random 
assignment of the instrument. The standard deviation of sales that we use in our case is strictly 
related to uncertainty (Bloom, 2009) and, likely, this volatility is randomly assigned to firms 






                                                           
15 Consistent standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping them in both first and second stage regressions. 
